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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS - IS AN
AGREEMENT TO CONVEY TO A NEGRO PROPERTY SUBJECT TO A RACIALLY
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT ACTIONABLE AS A CONSPIRACY? - The famous Unit-
ed States Supreme Court decision of Shelley v. Kraerner 1 received a narrowly
restricted application recently in an Oklahoma case involving an unusual
attempt to sustain a racially restrictive covenant with respect to land.
The plainiff, a party to an agreement that certain property should not
be sold to persons other than Caucasians, brought an action against one
of his co-covenantors which charged a conspiracy to evade the effect of
the covenant and wilfully and maliciously decrease the value of his own
property. The alleged conspiracy was entered into between the defendant
and an insolvent white mesne grantee who, by the terms of the alleged
conspiracy, was to convey land bordering the plaintiff's property to a
member of the Negro race. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, reversing an
order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, held that the precedent of
Shelley v. Kraemer was controlling in so far as the plaintiff sought to
invoke action by the state court to have the deed cancelled. Nevertheless,
a conspiracy of the type charged in the complaint gave rise to a cause of
action for damages enforceable in the Oklahoma courts. Correll v. Earley,
237 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1951).
Shelley v. Kraemer held that the injunctive enforcement of a racial
restrictive covenant against members of the Negro race constituted state
action which denied to Negroes the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In con-
trast to the Oklahoma decision, Barrows v. Jackson,2 a recent California
case involving a similar attempt to limit the effect of this holding, resulted
in a far broader and it is believed more accurate application of the rule
thus enunciated. The plaintiff in Barrows v. Jackson sued for breach of
contract, charging the defendant with vacating the premises in order to
permit persons not of the Caucasian race to occupy them, in breach of a
covenant restricting such occupation. The California decision was that the
rule of Shelley v Kraemer prevented the application of any state sanction,
direct or indirect, for breach of such a covenant.
.Prior to Shelley v. Kraemer the Oklahoma courts granted injunctive
relief in such cases, holding that racial restrictive covenants were not
void as against public policy 3 or in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.4 In other instances, it was recognized that equity would set aside
covenants if the original purpose and intention of the parties creating
1. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
2. 247 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1952).
3. Schwartz v. Hubbard, 198 Okla. 194, 177 P.2d 117 (1947); Hemsley v.
Sage, 194 Okla. 669, 154 P.2d 577 (1944); Lyons v. Wallen 191 Okla. 567, 133
P.2d 555 (1942).
4. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331 (1926) (court in referring to the
13th and 14th Amendments stated: ". .. while they provide . . . that all persons
and citizens shall have equal rights with white persons to make contracts and acquire
property, they . . . do not in any manner prohibit or invalidate contracts entered into
by private individuals in respect to the control and disposition of their own property."
This case constitutes principle authority for state decisions.); Hawkins v. Whayne,
198 Okia. 400, 179 P.2d 138 (1947); Lyons v. Wallen, 191 Okla. 567, 133 P.2d
555 (1942).
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the restrictions had been so destroyed by changed conditions, without
fault on the part of those who sought to have them enforced, that the
restrictions were no longer of substantial benefit to the residents and the
original purpose could not be reasonably effected by granting equitable
relief.! However, the Oklahoma courts were relctant even in such in-
stances to set racial covenants aside.6
The California courts, before Shelley v. Kraemer, would have enforced
covenants restricting the use or occupancy of property 7 but not covenants
restricting the sale of the property. 8 California had also set aside cove-
nants where the character of the restricted area 9 or the surrounding
property 10 had materially changed so as to render it unjust and inequit-
able to continue enforcing the covenant.
Because Shelley v. Kraemer, on its facts, involved merely the injunctive
enforcement of a restrictive covenant, and because the court indicated
that such agreements were not unlawful so long as the parties voluntarily
adhered to them, the Oklahoma court found it possible in the Correll
case to interpret Shelley v. Kraemer as invalidating only actions seeking
injunctive relief against the breach of such covenants.1  In Oklahoma
5. Southwest Petroleum Co. v. Logan, 180 Okla. 477, 71 P.2d 759 (1937.
(restriction of lots to residential occupancy prevented oil drilling operations); Van
Meter v. Manion, 170 Okla. 81, 38 P.2d' 557 (1934) (residential restrictive cove-
nant prevented erection of a business building).
6. Schwartz v. Hubbard, 198 Okla. 194, 177 P.2d 117 (1947) (the court.
in validating a racial restrictive covenant, cites Porter v. Johnson, 232 Mo. App.
1150, 115 S.W.2d 529 (1938) "If no radical change in the condition and use of
the restricted property -occurs, the circumstances that there have been changes in
the territory surrounding the covenanted area will not of itself be sufficient to destroy
the restrictions."); Hawkins v. Whayne, 198 Okla. 400, 179 P.2d 138, 143 (1947)
"'. . . the residents . . . are entitled to protection by having the restrictive cove-
nants enforced, even though another portion of the restricted area may be injured
tr its value reduced by the enforcement of the restrictions."; cf. Eakers v. Clopton, 199
Okla. 99, 184 P.2d 247 (1949).
7. Wayt v. Patee, 205 Cal. 46, 269 Pac. 660 (1928) (case initially determ-
ined that covenant against non-caucasian occupancy could be enforced by injunction):
Stone v. Jones, 66 Cal. App.2d 264, 152 P.2d "19 (1944); Burkhardt v. Loften, 63
Cal.App.2d 230, 146 P.2d 720, 724 (1944) "Non-Caucasians are and always have
been just as free to restrict the use and occupancy of their property to members
of their own races as Caucasians have been."
8. Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596, 597 (1919)
(court stated, when invalidating a deed containing a forfeiture clause with reversion
to grantee if property was sold, leased or rented to others than Caucasians, "The
condition that the property be not sold, leased or rented to one not of Caucasian birth
is clearly a restraint on alienation. . . . The condition, however, that the property
should not be occupied by a person not of Caucasian birth is in a different category."
9. Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P.2d 496 (1932) (racial covenant not
enforced where locality had become a "Negro district"); Robertson v. Nichols, 92
Cal. App.2d, 206 P.2d 898 (1949) (residential covenant).
10. Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal.2d 818, 151 P.2d 260, 264 (1944) (court
refusing to enforce a racial covenant stated: "In an area as small as that involved
in this case . . . and where the restricted lots do not form a single. contiguous group.
it would not seem essential that the occupancy of any such restricted lots them-
selves should have undergone a critical change . .. "); Downs v. Kroeger, 200
Cal. 743, 254 Pac. 1101 (1927) (residential Covenant not enforced due to change
in neighborhood).
11. Correll v. Earley, 237 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Okla. 1951)"... since the
restrictive covenant was valid the white seller would act at his peril of being re-
quired to pay plaintiff's damages for breach of a valid contract between himself and
other lot owners."; accord Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1039, 225 S.W.2d 127, 131
(1949) "We are of the opinion that an action for damages for the breach of a valid
agreement need not be affected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States
Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on this question ....
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this appears to mean that the Court has held that while a plaintiff cannot
seek equitable enforcement of these covenants he can bring an action for
breach of contract or sue for the tort which causes the breach. California
and other jurisdictions have held to the contrary.
12
The United States Supreme Court was first called upon to determine
the validity of racial restrictions when they were imposed by statute or
municipal ordinance. The court declared such statutes and ordinances
to be state action of a type prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.13 Subse-
quently two cases involving contractual race restrictions were submitted
to the court, but each case was disposed of on other grounds.14 The con-
stitutional question as to the authority of the various state courts to
enforce these covenants was therefore not settled until Shelley v. Kraemer.
Acts of the judiciary, whether procedural discriminations,'5 or en-
-forcement of substantive common law rules formulated by the courts,'8
constitute state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While the action in either the Correll or the Barrows case can be distin-
guished from the action in Shelley v. Kraemer, the distinction is purely
technical. Although the Oklahoma court is not restraining the vendor
from disposing of his property in violation of the covenant, it is subjecting
him to a charge of conspiracy to violate the covenant. The result, it
would seem, is the same. Both types of action, though one is more direct
than the other, have a deterrent effect on the vendor's willingness to
sell to any purchaser.17 It is submitted that the California court's inter-
12. Barrows v. Jackson, 247 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1952); Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F.Supp.
604 (D.C. 1950) (action for breach of racial restrictive covenant, court held Shelley
v. Kraemer was sufficiently broad to include an action for damages); Phillips v.
Naff, 332 Mich. 427, 52 N.W.2d 158, 161 (1952) "State action, as that phrase
is understood for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of
state power in all forms."
13. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78 (1917) "Colored persons are citizens
of the United States and have the right to purchase property and enjoy and use
the same without laws discriminating against them solely on account of color."; City
of Richmond v. Deans, 37 F.2d 712, (1930), aff'd mem., 281 U.S. 704 (1930);
Tyler v. Harmon, 160 La. 943, 107 So. 704 (1926), rev'd mer., 273 U.S. 668 (1927).
14. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331 (1926) "We . . . conclude
that neither the constitutional nor stattutory questions relied on as grounds for the
appeal to this Court have any substantial quality or color of merit, or afford any
jurisdictional basis for the appeal."; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (peti-
tioner was denied due process when Illinois Supreme Court held that petitioners were
bound by an earlier judgment to which they were not parties ).
15. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90 (1908) "The judicial act of the
highest court of the State, in authoritatively construing and enforcing its law is the
act of the State."; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 313 (1880); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880) "A State acts by
its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way.
The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of - the State
• . . shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
16. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) (enforce-
ment of common law policy which resulted in restraining peaceful picketing was
considered state action); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (enforceinent
of a common law rule relating to .contempt by publication was held to be state
action prohibited by the 14th Amendment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (defendant was convicted of the common law crime of breach of the peace:
under circumstances involving freedom of religion, it was held that such action was
state action, as prohibited by the 14th Amendment).
17. Phillips, v. Naff, 332 Mich. 427, 52 N.W.2d 158, 164 (1952) "... if a
sale of property subject to a reciprocal racial covenant cannot be made without
rendering the grantor liable to suits for damages, such . . . would operate to inhibit
freedom to purchase . . . and also place a burden on the right of .a owner to sell
to a purchaser of his own selection."
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pretation of Shelley v. Kraemer correctly appraises the true result of that
case.
CHRISTOPHER U. SYLVESTER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RIGHT TO FAIR AND IMPARTIAL HEARING-
NEWSPAPER PUBLICITY AS AN OBSTACLE TO A FAIR TRIAL. - The defend-
ant, a Collector of Internal Revenue, was indicted by a federal grand jury
for accepting bribes and issuing false certificates. Thereafter, despite
objections by the Department of Justice, a Congressional subcommittee
conducted an open public investigation of the conduct of the defendant's
office. As a result of the nation-wide publicity given these hearings, the
defendant moved for a continuance of his trial until the prejudicial effect
of the press coverage could wear off. The motion was denied. Held, con-
viction reversed. Forcing the defendant to trial under such circumstances
denied him his right to an impartial hearing. Nor was the defendant
obliged to move for a change of venue instead of a continuance, since he
had a constitutional right to be tried in the district where the alleged
offense was committed. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir..
1952).
The Court of Appeals did not make it clear whether it regarded its
decision as an exercise of its supervisory authority over the district courts
within its jurisdiction or as an adjudication that the defendant's rights
under either the Fifth 1 or Sixth 2 Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution had been violated. Under any view, the result seems highly
desirable. It is to be hoped that the case will have some tendency in
the future to prevent the "sensationalizing" of criminal prosecutions for
political or other purposes.
The larger issue inherent in the case is a complex one. What
practical measures can be taken, in view of the constitutional right of
newspapers to freedom of expression, to safeguard the rights of an indi-
vidual who is subjected to "trial by newspaper"? It seems clear that
direct action against the publications involved, by means of constructiie
contempt procedures, would have been ineffective. Congress can pass
no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press 3 and the same dis-
ability applies to the states by virtue of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 4 to the Federal Constitution. While the right of
freedom of speech and press is not unlimited 5 and does not prevent the pun-
ishment of those who abuse this freedom 6 courts -are extremely reluc-
tant to proceed against newspapers for contempt of court in instances
1. "No person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.... ." U.S Const., Amend. V.
2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed .. ." U.S. Const., Amend. VI.
3. U.S. Const., Amend. I.
4. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); see Carpenters Union
v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 726 (1942).
5. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
6. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upheld Smith Act sanctions
as not violating First Amendment); see Stromberg v. California, 282 U.S. 359. 368
(1931).
